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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALBERT JAMES GROSSI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020151-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Judge, 
presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the police may not 
enter a private home and seize items without a search warrant. The exceptions to this rule 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in 
Addendum A. 
are well-defined and based on considerations of public safety, officer safety, or 
homeowner consent. Without any of these justifications, the police entered a home, 
searched it, and seized items. Should the court have suppressed this evidence? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress this Court accords 
the trial court's legal conclusions no deference, but reviews them for correctness. State v. 
Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Factual findings, however, are 
accepted by this Court unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819, 
822 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 34-40, 60-71. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is relevant on appeal: 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 29,2000 Appellant Albert James Grossi was charged by 
information with four drug-related counts. R. 2-4. He pled not-guilty to the counts, and a 
2 
preliminary hearing was held. R. 167. The court found that there was probable cause to 
believe that Mr. Grossi had committed the crimes, and bound him over for trial. R. 167 
[66]. 
Soon afterwards, the defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence of drugs 
and drug paraphernalia found in Mr. Grossi's home. R. 34. In support of this, the defense 
counsel pointed out that the police did not have a warrant to search Mr. Grossi's home 
and had no other justification for either entering it or searching it. R. 67-70. The trial 
court disagreed and ruled that the evidence would be allowed. R. 104. 
Thereafter, Mr. Grossi pled guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance on 
condition that he could appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 121-
128. The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced him accordingly. R. 130-33. Mr. 
Grossi filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 134-35. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 15,2000 Officers Jason Knight and Perry Beauchaine responded to 
a report that a man was assaulting two women in a residential neighborhood. R. 167 [3-
4]. As the Officers approached the scene, a woman identified as Shandra Karren ran 
towards them waving her hands. R. 102, 167 [3]. She said that a man had "dragged" her 
friend, Andrea Layne, down some stairs into a basement apartment and was assaulting her 
there. R. 103,167 [4,18]. Ms. Karren also said that Ms. Layne was six months pregnant. 
R. 168 [7]. 
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Officer Knight descended the stairs leading to the basement apartment, and 
knocked on the door. R. 167 [4]. Mr. Grossi immediately appeared at the door's window. 
Id. at 4-5. Officer Knight asked him to open the door. R. 168 [8]. Mr. Grossi refused, 
saying that "he didn't want to go to jail." Id. at 9. Officer Knight said he needed to check 
the welfare of the woman inside. IcL Mr. Grossi said that she was fine, and he yelled for 
"her to tell [Officer Knight] that she's okay." Id at 10. However, Officer Knight did not 
hear her answer. R. 167 [5]. Officer Knight continued to ask Mr. Grossi to open the door, 
and he continued to refuse. R. 168 [10]. This type of exchange continued for about ten 
minutes. R. 167 [5]. At one point, Mr. Grossi told Officer Knight that the woman "was 
going out a cellar door." R. 168 [10]. Officer Knight heard "yelling and commotion" from 
"around the back," but he did not know what it was about. R. 167 [5]. Eventually, Officer 
Knight said that he "wasn't going to go away" until he "found out what had happened and 
if the female was okay." R. 167 [5]. Officer Knight also said that he needed to search Mr. 
Grossi for weapons. Id. Finally, Mr. Grossi came out, leaving the door slightly ajar 
behind him.2 
Officer Knight grabbed Mr. Grossi's hands behind his back and did a pat-down 
search for weapons. R. 168 [11]. About this time, Officer Beauchaine joined Officer 
Knight, and they handcuffed Mr. Grossi and arrested him "[f]or interfering and not 
coming out, delaying [the] investigation." R. 167 [7]. They did not give him a Miranda 
2
 Officer Knight testified that the door "was cracked. . . . it was shut a little bi t . . . . it 
wasn't like wide open but it wasn't shut all the way, no." R. 167 [6]. 
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warning. R. 168 [35]. Nor did they search his apartment at that time. Id. They simply took 
him up the stairs to the patrol car. R. 167 [26], R. 168 [14]. Officer Lyman Guest had 
arrived on the scene in response to their call for help, and he took charge of Mr. Grossi. 
R. 168 [14]. 
After leaving Mr. Grossi in Officer Guest's charge, Officer Knight spoke with 
Officer Beauchaine, Ms. Karren and another witness named Shawn. R. 167, [8,17], 168 
[14]. Shawn said that, before the officers had arrived, there had been a heated exchange 
between Mr. Grossi, Ms. Karren, and Ms. Layne. R. 167 [8]. However, there had been no 
physical violence. Id, Conversely, Ms. Karren maintained that Mr. Grossi had pushed Ms. 
Layne toward the apartment. R. 167 [17-18]. 
About this time Officer Beauchaine told Officer Knight that Ms. Layne had come 
out the side door of the apartment and had run away while he had been speaking with Mr. 
Grossi. R. 168 [15]. 
With the alleged victim long gone, the officers gathered around the patrol car to 
consider their next course of action. R. 167 [8]. They considered looking for Ms. Layne. 
Id. However, in the end they decided simply to transport Mr. Grossi to jail. R. 167 [8], 
168 [16]. Mr. Grossi was unhappy about going to jail and was worried about leaving his 
apartment unlocked. R. 167 [8], 168 [16]. A neighbor who was standing nearby said that 
Mr. Grossi asked the police to "[l]et me lock my door. Someone might take my stuff." R. 
168 [60]. An officer had replied, "We'll take care of it." Mr. Grossi had responded, "No, 
5 
let me take care of it 
Nevertheless, Officer Knight decided to secure the apartment himself. R. 167 [9]. 
He went down to the apartment door and tried to lock it, but found that it could not be 
locked without a key. Id. He returned to the patrol car and asked Mr. Grossi for the key, 
but he didn't have it. Id. He said that he thought Ms. Layne had the key. Id. Officer 
Knight again went to the apartment. Id. He looked inside the apartment and saw that it 
was dark and cluttered. R. 167 [10]. He also saw a lamp broken on the living room floor. 
Id. Just then, Ms. Karren came out of the bedroom. Id. at 11. This startled Officer Knight, 
and he asked her what she was doing there. Id. She explained that she had slept there the 
night before and had come back to get her coat.4 Officer Knight testified that she seemed 
nervous and that her presence in the apartment made him nervous. R. 167 [11]. He 
decided to do a pat down search of her, but he found no weapons. Id 
At this point, Officer Knight decided to do a "security check" of the apartment. R. 
168 [17]. He testified that he did this for safety reasons: 
any time that we're in a situation where we feel like we could be in danger 
when we're out in the living room and we don't know what's doing on, we 
just do a visual search and make sure there is no one else in the apartment 
that can come out and injure us. 
IdL at 12. However, he also testified that he had heard no sounds and had seen no shadows 
3
 Id. at 60-61. Officer Knight's testimony was more vague. He testified that Mr. Grossi 
"stated that he wanted his house secured." R. 167 [27]. Officer Beauchaine testified that he 
recalled "hearing Mr. Grossi express concern about the apartment and whether it would be 
secured sufficiently or properly." Id. at 56. 
4
 It was a cool November evening. R. 167 [2,11]. 
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or movements. Id. at 34. Only Ms. Karren's unexpected appearance and her nervousness 
prompted the search. Id. at 35. 
Using a flashlight, Officer Knight went into the bedroom and found "multiple drug 
type items out in plain view." R. 167 [12]. There was a baggie containing a white powder, 
bottles, marijuana, a yellow crystal-like substance, and scales. Id. Officer Knight called 
Officer Beauchaine down, and they seized these items. Id at 13. Then they transported 
Mr. Grossi to jail, and he was charged with four drug-related crimes. R. 2-4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State did not meet its heavy burden of showing that Officer Knight's search of 
Mr. Grossi's home was justified even though Officer Knight did not have an appropriate 
search warrant. As a general rule, the police must obtain a search warrant before 
searching a home. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969). There are exceptions 
to this rule, but they are "jealously and carefully drawn," and must be stringently applied. 
United States v. Aquino. 836 F.2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988). Because of this, the 
State's burden is particularly heavy. United States v. Anderson. 981 F.2d 1560,1567 (10th 
Cir. 1992). And it was not met here. 
This argument analyzes the facts of this case under four exceptions to the warrant 
requirement rule.5 Those exceptions are: "protective sweeps" conducted during in-home 
5
 There are other exceptions, but they are wholly unrelated to the circumstances of this 
case and will not be explored. Exceptions not explored are set out in footnote fifteen. 
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arrests;6 consent by the homeowner;7 items in "plain view" of the officer;8 and 
emergencies.9 
First, the search of Mr. Grossi's apartment cannot be justified under the 
"protective sweep" exception because Mr. Grossi was not arrested in his home; he was 
arrested outside. And, as the case law holds, protective sweeps may be conducted only 
during in-home arrests. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337. Further, the alleged victim in this case, Ms. 
Layne, had left the apartment and run away. R. 168 [15]. So there was no practical reason 
for Officer Knight to search the apartment for her. What is more, there are no facts here to 
show that an unknown person inside posed a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is a 
crucial requirement of protective sweeps, and without some pertinent showing, the sweep 
cannot be justified. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. 
Second, the consent exception does not apply because Mr. Grossi did not consent 
to Officer Knight's search. In fact, the most that the record shows is that he expressed 
concern about leaving his apartment unlocked. R. 103. This is a far cry from the 
"unequivocal and specific" consent required under the case law. United States v. Iribe. 11 
F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993). And it does not show that the consent was "freely and 
voluntarily given." Bumper. 391 U.S. at 548. The State had the burden of proving both of 
6
 Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). 
7
 Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). 
8
 State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715, 718 (1983). 
9
 United States v. Bute. 43 F.3d 531. 539 (10th Cir. 1994). 
8 
these things, and it did not meet that burden. 
Third, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply because the State did not show that 
Officer Knight was lawfully in Mr. Grossi's bedroom when he seized the items that were 
in "plain view" there. Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. Lawful presence in the area where items 
are seized is a crucial element of the "plain view" exception, Id,, and it was not met here. 
Finally, Officer Knight's search is not valid under the emergency, or "exigent 
circumstances" doctrine because there is no indication that Ms. Layne, or anyone else, 
was in immediate need of assistance at the time of the search. Without an immediate 
need, the emergency doctrine may be invoked. Bute, 43 F.3d at 539. 
In short, Officer Knight's search of Mr. Grossi's apartment and the seizure of 
items he found there violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. And so, the items he seized cannot be used against Mr. Grossi at 
trial, and the trial court's denial of Mr. Grossi's motion to sever was erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE A WARRANT OR ANY OTHER LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR SEARCHING MR, GROSSI'S HOME 
Nothing about this case shows that the police were justified in searching Mr. 
Grossi's home and seizing items that they found. They did not have a search warrant or 
Mr. Grossi's permission to enter his home. The alleged victim had run away and so there 
was no need to search for her. Mr. Grossi had been arrested outside and so there was no 
9 
need to search for him. Indeed, the only reason given for Officer Knight's decision to 
enter the home is Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving his door unlocked while the police 
transported him to jail. R. 167 [26-27]. However, his concern did not give the officers the 
right to enter his apartment, or to search it. In fact, this is such a thin justification for a 
search that it forcefully brings to mind the United States Supreme Court's warning that 
arresting a man does not give the police the right to "rummage at will among his papers in 
search of whatever will convict him . . . . " Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 
(1969). The police cannot be so zealous in their duty that they forget the constitutional 
limitations on their authority. 
The limitation at issue here is set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment absolutely forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. 
IV. Furthermore, the reasonableness of a search and seizure is not an amorphous 
abstraction that varies with each case. There are well-defined rules that guide the 
evaluation of searches and seizures. And they must be strictly applied. 
Significantly, police must, whenever practicable, obtain a search warrant to search 
a home. ChimeL 395 U.S. at 758. This is not an empty formality. On the contrary, it is the 
substance of the Fourth Amendment itself. As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, the decision of whether to invade the privacy of a home should be left to an 
objective magistrate rather than to the police, who are biased because their purpose is to 
detect crime and arrest criminals: 
10 
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave 
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the 
citizen and the police. This was not done to shield criminals nor to make the 
home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective 
mind might weigh the need to invade the privacy in order to enforce the 
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the 
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals.10 
The wisdom of the warrant requirement has been proven through years of 
application and experience. Id. And now, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable 
unless the circumstances fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). These exceptions include: 
protective sweeps incident to an arrest,11 consent of the homeowner,12 items in plain view 
during a lawful intrusion,13 and emergencies.14 The lines defining these exceptions are 
"jealously and carefully drawn," and must be stringently applied. United States v. 
Aquino, 836 R2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988). 
In this case, the police did not have a warrant to enter and search Mr. Grossi's 
10
 Id at 761. See also Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10,14 (1948) (Crime, even in 
the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows 
such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a 
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell 
in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably 
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
Government enforcement agent.") 
11
 Chime!, 395 U.S. at 763. 
12
 State v. Kellev. 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986). 
13
 State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983). 
14
 United States v. Bute. 43 F.3d 531, 539 (10th Cir. 1994). 
11 
home. R. 102-04. And so, the search may be justified only if it falls into one of the 
exceptions described above.15 And, as an analysis shows, none of the exceptions apply. 
The four subsections below apply the facts of this case to the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. Subsection A shows that the police were not justified in conducting 
a protective sweep of Mr. Grossi's home. Subsection B shows that the police did not have 
Mr. Grossi consent to enter or search his home. Subsection C shows that the seizure of 
items was not justified under the "plain view" doctrine. Finally, Subsection D shows that 
there was no threat, emergency, or danger that justified the police officers' entry into Mr. 
Grossi's home. 
A, The "Protective Sweep" Doctrine does not Justify the Search of Mr, 
Grossi's Home 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Officer Knight was justified in 
conducting a protective sweep of Mr. Grossi's apartment because Ms. Karren startled him 
by emerging from the bedroom while he was trying to lock the apartment's door. R. 88-
89, 104. The trial court indicated that Ms. Karren's "nervous demeanor and the possibility 
15
 There are a few other exceptions to the warrant requirement rule, such as the "hot 
pursuit" exception in which the police are justified in entering a private domain to complete an 
arrest. Brown, 853 P.2d at 855. There is also the "open view" exception in which the police are 
justified in seizing items in public areas. Id. Some jurisdictions even allow an exception when 
there is imminent danger of the loss or destruction of evidence. United States v. Anderson. 981 
F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992). 
However, in this case none of the exceptions apply and so they are no explored and 
applied to the facts. 
12 
that others might be present in the apartment," justified Officer's Knight's decision to 
conduct the sweep. R. 89. The court also noted that the victim could have come back to 
the apartment, that she may have been injured or in need of help. IcL Therefore, the court 
concluded, "Officer Knight's decision to conduct a 'protective sweep' of the apartment [] 
became an appropriate and necessary security measure "Id. 
The trial court's holding is incorrect from every standpoint of the "protective 
sweep" case law as it has developed under United States Supreme Court decisions. To 
begin with, a protective sweep of a home is conducted only when a suspect is arrested 
inside of his home; if he is arrested outside the home or at some other location, the home 
may not be entered unless there is some other basis for the intrusion.16 This is because 
protective sweeps are justified only by the possibility of danger from unknown persons 
inside the home where officers are making an arrest. This danger, as the United States 
Supreme Court has explained, is why officers may make a temporary deviation from the 
right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment: 
the arresting officers are permitted [while making an in-home arrest] to take 
reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest. 
That interest is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may 
entail. 
16
 See Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) ("The Fourth Amendment permits a 
properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching 
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be 
swep harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763 ('There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 
'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.") 
13 
Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. And so, if the officers aren't arresting a suspect at home, there is 
no danger from persons in the home and a protective sweep is not justified. 
Furthermore, a protective sweep is not automatically justified even if the suspect is 
arrested at home. Two other conditions must be met. First, a protective sweep may be 
conducted only if there are articulable facts that, "taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that 
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." 
Id. Second, the sweep may not be a "full search of the premise," it is only "a cursory 
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found." Id. at 335. 
In this case, Officer's Knight's protective sweep was illegal for several reasons. 
Most significantly, Mr. Grossi was not even arrested inside his home. He was arrested 
outside. R. 168 [12-13]. And, he did not open his door and invite the police in. He 
stepped outside and closed his door almost all the way. R. 168 [12-13]. Because of this, 
the protective sweep was illegal and no further analysis is necessary. 
But even if the analysis continues, the propriety of the sweep does not improve. 
This is because there were no articulable facts that would warrant a reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Grossi's home harbored persons dangerous to those on the arrest scene. The 
arrest scene, by the time Officer Knight entered the apartment and conducted the sweep, 
had moved from the area outside Mr. Grossi's apartment to the street, where Officer 
Knight's and Officer Guest's patrol cars were parked. R. 167 [26-27]. Officer 
Beauchaine, Officer Guest, and Mr. Grossi were all gathered there. Id There is nothing to 
14 
show that these people were in any danger from someone in the apartment. 
Further, there is nothing to show that Officer Knight himself, who had come back 
to the apartment to lock the door, was in any danger. And if he felt that he was, he could 
have simply withdrawn. Earlier, he had made this very choice. When he was speaking to 
Mr. Grossi through his door window, Officer Knight did not go in because of his 
trepidation about what he would encounter in the apartment. R. 167 [23]. This shows that 
Officer Knight knew he had no obligation to enter the apartment if he felt he was danger. 
And an obligation to enter did not arise after Mr. Grossi was arrested. 
Certainly, he was under no obligation to lock Mr. Grossi's door; in fact, a neighbor 
overhearing the scene testified that Mr. Grossi did not want Officer Knight to lock it. R. 
168 [60]. Mr. Grossi wanted to lock it himself. IdL This casts grave doubt on Officer 
Knight's right to be in the apartment at all. Regardless of that, however, if Officer Knight 
felt he was in danger inside the apartment, he was under no obligation to stay. The arrest 
had been completed and Mr. Grossi was handcuffed in Officer Guest's car, R. 168 [12], 
the witnesses had been interviewed, Id. at 14-16, and the alleged victim was long gone.17 
17
 R. 167 [53], 168 [15]. The trial court rested its justification of the protective sweep 
largely on its factual finding that Officer Knight had wished to search for the alleged victim. R. 
103. However, this finding is not supported by the record. During the preliminary hearing, 
Officer Knight testified that his sole reason for conducting the sweep was the unexpected 
appearance of Ms. Karren from the bedroom and her nervousness. R. 167 [11-12, 32-34]. And 
his written reports reflect this. R. 168 [24-25]. 
The evidence, fully marshaled to support the trial court's finding, consists of only one 
thing: Officer Knight's sole statement at the suppression hearing that he thought the alleged 
victim may have returned. R. 168 [24-25]. This, however, is an afterthought on the part of 
Officer Knight and it does not reflect his true reasoning at the time of the sweep. 
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There was no reason for Officer Knight to have stayed. 
Several cases are directly on point. In Brown v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court 
held that the police had conducted an unlawful protective sweep while serving a "lady in 
pajamas" with a two-year-old arrest warrant for a traffic citation. Brown v. State, 738 
P.2d 1092, 1093 (Wyo. 1987). The police had attempted to serve the lady on her front 
porch. Id. However, she had turned and walked into her mobile home. Id at 1093-94. 
They followed her inside and discovered an empty knife sheath on the floor. Id at 1094. 
On this basis, the police decided to conduct a protective sweep. Id, In doing so, 
discovered marijuana. Id. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that this was unlawful because the lady had 
been arrested on her front porch and there was nothing to show that a sweep of the home 
The record shows this. Testimony by all of the police officers, including Officer Knight, 
shows that the victim was long gone by the time Officer Knight conducted his search. Officer 
Beauchaine had seen her jump over a fence and run away during the time Officer Knight was 
speaking with Mr. Grossi through the door. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer Knight learned about this 
immediately after arresting Mr. Grossi, and before going down to lock the apartment. R. 167, [8, 
17], 168 [14]. In fact, Officer Knight himself testified several times that he knew the alleged 
victim was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15]. And so, there is no basis for the trial court's finding 
that Officer Knight's wish to search for the victim supported his decision to do a protective 
sweep. 
Further, even if Officer Knight was truly concerned about the victim, this does not justify 
a protective sweep. Protective sweeps are conducted to dispel threats to those on the arrest scene. 
They are not justified by any other reason. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337. 
To be sure, nobody denies that searching for a possibly injured victim does not justify a 
search. However, this type of search falls under a different exception to the warrant-requirement 
rule and must be analyzed accordingly. This analysis is found in Subsection D: "There was no 
Emergency, Danger, or Threat that Justified the Police Officer's Entry into Mr. Grossi's Home." 
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was necessary: 
appellant was arrested outside her home, and we can find nothing in the 
record to support a reasonable belief that there might be other persons 
inside appellant's home who posed a threat to the officers' safety. 
Id. at 1095. The Court also noted that the State in that case had not even established the 
validity of the arrest, and that the circumstances did not show that there was a reasonable, 
articulable threat of danger: 
If we were to uphold the search conducted in this case on the record before 
us, we would open the door to the possibility of warrantless general 
searches of the homes of every citizen ever given a traffic citation. Law 
enforcement officers may not use the pretext of an arrest on a minor charge 
as a means to engage in an overbroad search to uncover evidence of an 
unrelated offense. 
Id at 1096-97. 
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court denounced a protective sweep of a man's 
home after he was arrested outside. Hayes v. State. 797 P.2d 962, 971 (Nev. 1990). In that 
case, the man called out "Dawn" two or three times as he was arrested. Id at 964. On this 
basis, the police entered his home and conducted a protective search, finding narcotics 
and paraphernalia in "plain view." Id. at 963. They also found the man's wife, Dawn 
Richmond, in the back bedroom. Id at 964. 
According to the testimony, there had been some concern by the police officers 
that the arrestee was calling to Don Cisco, a felon who had been recently released from 
jail. Id at 964. However, the evidence also showed that the police knew the arrestee's 
wife was named "Dawn," and that she lived in the home. Id 
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After examining the general guidelines governing protective searches, the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable, articulable belief of danger in this case. 
Id. at 967. Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, this Court expressed concern that without 
such a belief, discemable from typical circumstances, the Fourth Amendment protections 
would be practically a nullity: 
the police would have carte blanch power to conduct sweep searches of 
citizens' homes incident to virtually any arrest for a felony, whether violent 
or not, even where the arrestee surrenders at the front door; by means of 
post-hoc rationalizations, the police could justify virtually any sweep 
search.... We further believe that this is why, in Buie, the [United States] 
Supreme Court affirmed the requirement that officers' perception of danger 
be based on some specific and articulable grounds. 
Id 
The Court also approved the idea that police officers, once they carry out their 
duty of arrest, should withdraw if their forebodings of danger are based on hunches or 
general anxiety: 
absent greater indication of danger than was present in this case, it appears 
that it would have been far safer for the six armed police officers simply to 
withdraw after [the arrestee] was in safe custody, instead of proceeding 
through each room of the resident and risk confrontation with others who 
might be present. 
Id. And, the Court held that third persons inside a home do not justify a sweep unless 
there is some indication that they are dangerous. However, "[i]f officers have no 
reasonable basis to fear danger from third persons," they are constitutionally required to 
withdraw. Id, 
Cases from the Tenth Circuit are in accord. One case like this is State v. Anderson. 
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where the Tenth Circuit held that government agents were not justified in returning to a 
defendant's house to conduct a protective sweep after arresting the defendant some 
distance away in his vehicle. Anderson, 981 F.2d at 1562-63, 1568. In that case, the 
government tried to justify the sweep on the basis that the agents were worried that those 
in the house would become suspicious and destroy evidence. IdL at 1563. The Tenth 
Circuit, noting that exceptions to the warrant requirement must be "jealously and 
carefully drawn," held that this search could not be justified under the "protective sweep" 
doctrine. Id at 1567. There was no danger to officers, and the danger that evidence would 
be involved a different analysis, which incidently, was also not met. Id at 1567-68. 
Another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Baca, involved the illegal sweep of a 
defendant's home after he had been arrested for a parole violation. In that case, unlike 
those explored above, the defendant actually was arrested inside of his home, as required 
by the "protective sweep" cases. United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103,104 (10th Cir. 
1969). However, the Tenth Circuit held there was nothing to justify a sweep of his entire 
house, and that the drugs and paraphernalia found was the fruit of an illegal search and 
seizure: 
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by 
the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault 
an officer or effect an escape, or as well as by the need to prevent the 
destruction of evidence of the crime - things which might easily happen 
where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his 
immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is 
remote in time or place from the arrest. 
LI at 105. 
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The principals set out in the cases above show that the protective sweep conducted 
by Officer Knight in this case was not justified. As shown in Brown and Hayes, arresting 
a suspect outside of his front door is not enough to justify a sweep of the house. And that 
is precisely what happened here. Mr. Grossi was arrested outside of his house, and almost 
immediately taken to the patrol car. 
Also, as shown in all four cases explored above, there must be some specific 
indicia of danger; something atypical. Otherwise, any arrest would be a justification for a 
sweep and people's homes would be secure only if they were not at home.18 In this case 
there is nothing to show that there were specific indicia of danger or even that the 
circumstances were atypical. The most that the record shows is that Officer Knight was 
startled when Ms. Karren emerged from the bedroom. R. 167 [11-12]. However, this is 
not enough. Ms. Karren was not unknown to Officer Knight; he had already spoken with 
her several times. R. 167 [3-4], 168 [14]. He did not know her to be a dangerous person. 
Id. Further, he even knew that she was staying in the apartment. R. 167 [30]. And so, 
even if her presence startled him and gave him foreboding, his proper course of action 
should have been to withdraw, as instructed by the courts in Hayes and Anderson. Her 
emergence from the bedroom did not amount to a reasonable, articulable indication of 
danger. 
18
 See Chimel 395 U.S. at 767. ("True, by hypothesis the power [to search] would not 
exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to 
know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.") 
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In sum, Officer Knight was not justified in entering Mr. Grossi's home or 
conducting a sweep. His actions were unconstitutional, and any items he discovered 
during the course of this activity should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
B. The Police did not Have Mr, Grossi's Consent to Enter his Home 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Mr. Grossi essentially consented 
to Officer Knight's entry into the apartment by expressing concern about leaving the 
apartment unlocked. R. 104. This conclusion was based upon several testimonies which 
have some slight, but significant, variation. One of the testimonies was that of a neighbor 
who overheard the conversation between Mr. Grossi and the police. According to the 
neighbor, Mr. Grossi asked the police to "[l]et me lock my door. Someone might take my 
stuff." R. 168 [60]. An officer had replied, "Well take care of it." Mr. Grossi had 
responded, "No, let me take care of it " Id. at 60-61. Officer Knight also testified 
about the conversation, but his testimony was more vague. He testified that Mr. Grossi 
"stated that he wanted his house secured." R. 167 [27]. Then, Officer Beauchaine testified 
that he recalled "hearing Mr. Grossi express concern about the apartment and whether it 
would be secured sufficiently or properly." Id. at 56. In the end, the trial court found that 
Mr. Grossi "said that he wanted his apartment locked up and secured," and that "Officer 
Knight went back to the apartment to lock the door because the defendant was in 
custody." R. 103. On this basis, the trial court concluded Mr. Grossi had consented as a 
matter of law. R. 104. 
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However, regardless of the trial court's factual findings, its legal conclusion that 
Mr. Grossi consented to the intrusion is not sustainable. This is because neither the 
neighbor, Officer Knight, nor Officer Beauchaine testified to any facts that meet the legal 
standards required for consent. This is demonstrated by an examination of the case law. 
The case law shows that the chief rule of consent is that, "[w]hen a prosecutor 
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of 
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Several cases are helpful in understanding this. One 
of the most helpful is the leading United States Supreme Court opinion, Bumper v. North 
Carolina. In that case, the police gained entrance to a home by claiming to have a search 
warrant when, in fact, the warrant was faulty. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546-49. The Court 
held that, in such circumstances, consent is not given. The Court reasoned that an 
officer's announcement that he has a search warrant does not give rise to consent, only 
acquiescence to a claim of authority: 
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a 
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the 
search. The situation is instinct with coercion - albeit colorably lawful 
coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent. 
Id at 550. 
Another case where voluntary consent was not shown was the Tenth Circuit case 
of United States v. Salinas-Cano. In that case, law enforcement agents wanted to search 
the belongings of the defendant, who they suspected of being a drug dealer. United States 
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v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 862 (10th Cir. 1992). They knew that the defendant spent 
several nights per week at his girlfriend's home. Id They went to her home, obtained her 
consent to search her home, and searched it. Id They found the defendant's suitcase with 
incriminating evidence inside, and seized it. Id. In these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit 
held that the search was unconstitutional. Id at 866. After first noting that the government 
has the burden of proving consent, the Tenth Circuit held that ambiguous situations must 
be clarified by law enforcement before they proceed with a searched: 
The burden [of showing consent] cannot be met if agents, faced with an 
ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry. 
If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear 
whether the property about to be searched is subject to "mutual use" by the 
person giving consent, "then warrantless entry is unlawful without further 
inquiry." 
Id. at 864 (emphasis and citations omitted). 
And again, in United States v. Iribe. the Tenth Circuit held that consent was not 
given where it was unclear whether a Spanish-speaking property owner had given her 
consent to a search. United States v. Iribe. 11 F.3d 1553, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1993). In that 
case, the police stopped the defendant in his car pursuant to a federal arrest warrant. Id. at 
1555. After the arrest, they went to the residence where they suspected he lived, and 
knocked on the door. Id. A young woman who spoke only Spanish answered the door. Id. 
One of the officers spoke Spanish, and he testified that she consented to the search. She 
also signed a consent form, written in English, which the officer had verbally translated 
for her. Id. The search of the house and the detached garage yielded substantial evidence 
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against the defendant. Id at 1556. 
The Tenth Circuit examined the situation closely and held that consent was not 
given. In so holding, the Court emphasized that consent must be "unequivocal and 
specific," as well as "freely and intelligently given." Id at 1557. If it is not, the search 
cannot be considered valid. Id, The Court also noted that "[t]he voluntariness of consent 
must be determined from the totality of the circumstances," Id., and that where the 
circumstances appear to overbear the property owner's choice, consent cannot be found. 
On the other hand, consent was shown in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v. 
Kelley. In that case, an officer arrived at the defendant's door after following footprints in 
the snow from the scene of a homicide to the defendant's house. Kelley, 718 P.2d at 389. 
The defendant, who was in his underwear, allowed the officer in and the officer saw a 
distinctive item of evidence in plain view. Id. The officer then followed the defendant 
into his bedroom, where the defendant wished to dress, and found more items of 
evidence. Id The Court held that, in that case, the defendant consented to the officer's 
entry into his home and so his expectation of privacy was "substantially reduced." Id. 
And, after the officer saw evidence in plain view, the officer was justified in following 
the defendant into the bedroom to ensure that the defendant did not try any acts of 
evasion or harm. Id, 
In this case, the facts are much more similar to those where consent was not found 
than to State v. Kelley above. Here, Mr. Grossi merely stated that he wanted to lock his 
door, R. 168 [60-61], or that he wanted it locked. R. 167 [27, 56]. This is, at the very best, 
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was ambiguous with regard to consent. Certainly, it is not the clear, unequivocal consent 
specifically required under Salinas-Cano and Iribe. And in fact, if the totality of 
circumstances is regarded as required by Iribe. it must be concluded that Mr. Grossi did 
not give his consent to Officer Knight's entry. Mr. Grossi had already shown that he did 
not want the officers in his apartment by refusing to allow them entry when they first 
arrived, R. 167 [4-5], and by closing the door when he finally came out after Officer 
Knight's repeated requests. WL at 6. In these circumstances, the fact that he wanted his 
door locked after he was arrested cannot support Officer Knight's decision to enter Mr. 
Grossi's apartment. 
C. The "Plain View" Doctrine Does not Justify the Search 
The trial court also cites the "plain view" doctrine as justification for Officer 
Knight's search and seizure of items in Mr. Grossi's home.19 However, the plain view 
doctrine does not apply. This is because the requirements for application of the doctrine 
are not met. These requirements are: 
(1) the officer is lawfully present where the search and seizure occur; (2) 
the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the evidence is clearly incriminating.20 
19
 R. 85,104. Notably, the plain view doctrine is different from the "open view" doctrine. 
The plain view doctrine applies it evidence legally found inside of a private domicile or 
business, Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. On the other hand, the "open view" doctrine allows the 
police to gather any evidence that it finds in a public area, or viewable from a public area. State 
v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
20
 Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. See also State v. McArthun 2000 UT App 23, [^22, 996 P.2d 
555. 
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The first requirement, which is that the officer must be lawfully present, is not met 
because Officer Knight was not lawfully present in Mr. Grossi's apartment.21 Mr. Grossi 
had closed the door behind him when he had emerged from his apartment at Officer 
Knight's request, R. 167 [6], and Officer Knight had no further business at the apartment 
after taking Mr. Grossi up to Officer Guest's patrol car. The victim had run off, R. 168 
[15], the witnesses had been interviewed, and there was no further reason to stay in the 
vicinity. And, as shown in the previous subsection, Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving 
his apartment unlocked did not give Officer Knight the legal right to enter the apartment. 
And so, his very presence in the entryway was illegal and anything that was in "plain 
view" could not have been legally seized. 
Importantly, even if Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving his apartment unlocked 
constituted clear, unequivocal consent for Officer Knight to be in the doorway, he was not 
justified in going any further. Certainly, he was not justified in going into the back 
bedroom. The case law specifically holds that it is fundamental that an officer may not 
exceed the scope of his invitation into a private home: 
If he or she is invited onto private property, a government agent "does not 
need probable cause nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the 
scope of his invitation." . . . "Once inside the house, [an agent may not] 
exceed the scope of his invitation by ransacking the house generally, but he 
may seize anything in plain view." 
McArthur. 2000 UT App 23, ^[23. And so, even if Officer Knight was lawfully in Mr. 
21
 Because the first requirement is not met, it is irrelevant whether the other requirements 
are met and so analysis is not provided. 
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Grossi's doorway, he was not justified in entering any further. The very most that could 
be implied from the ambiguous conversation about Mr. Grossi's unlocked front door is 
that Officer Knight could lock the door. That is all. And because no incriminating 
evidence was in plain view from the doorway, R. 167 [10-12], none of the evidence 
gathered from Mr. Grossi's apartment may be admitted at trial under the plain view 
doctrine. 
D. There was no Emergency. Danger, or Threat that Justified the Police 
Officer's Entry into Mr, Grossi's Home 
Although the trial court did not specifically rely on the theory that an emergency, 
danger, or threat justified Officer Knight's intrusion into Mr. Grossi's home, the court did 
refer to the possibility that the alleged victim may have returned. R. 87. The court also 
referred to the possibility that she may have been injured. Id. Because of these references, 
an analysis of the emergency, or "exigent circumstances" doctrine is appropriate in this 
appeal. 
Under the exigent circumstances doctrine courts recognize that certain 
circumstances justify the warrantless entry of police or rescue workers into a private 
dwelling: 
the protection of property may constitute an exigency sufficient to permit 
police to 'enter premises without warrants for such emergency purposes as 
aiding in fire-fighting, giving first aid to people in distress, protecting 
persons or property from threatened harm, and the like. 
Bute. 43 F.3d at 539. To invoke this doctrine, the person who entered the private dwelling 
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"must have had an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required 
immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to persons or property within."22 
In this case, Officer Knight had no "objectively reasonable belief that an 
emergency existed in Mr. Grossi's apartment or his bedroom. Nobody cried out from the 
apartment or bedroom, no noises were heard, and after Mr. Grossi was arrested nobody 
claimed that any emergency was going on inside. Nevertheless, the trial court found that 
Officer's Knight's entry was justified, in part, on his desire to check on the welfare of the 
alleged victim. R. 103-04. But not only are the factual aspects of this finding 
unsupported, the legal conclusion that this justified entry is incorrect. 
First of all, the record does not support the trial court's finding that Officer Knight 
entered the bedroom because of his concern for the victim. During the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Knight testified that his sole reason for conducting the sweep was the 
unexpected appearance of Ms. Karren from the bedroom and her nervousness. R. 167 
[11-12, 32-34]. And, his written reports support this. R. 168 [24-25]. 
What is more, the evidence, fully marshaled to support the trial court's finding, 
consists only of the following: Officer Knight's sole statement at the suppression hearing 
that the alleged victim may have returned to the apartment. R. 168 [17]. However, this 
statement was an afterthought and it does not reflect Officer Knight's true thoughts at the 
time of the sweep. The record proves this. Officer Beauchaine had seen Ms. Layne 
emerge from the apartment, jump over a fence, and run away during the time Officer 
22
 Id. See also. State v. Davis. 666 P.2d 802, 809 (Or. 1983). 
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Knight was speaking with Mr. Grossi through the door. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer 
Beauchaine told Officer Knight this after Mr. Grossi was arrested. R. 167, [8,17], 168 
[14]. In fact, Officer Knight himself testified several times that he knew the alleged 
victim was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15]. 
Furthermore, the fact that Ms. Karren returned to the apartment does support any 
inference that Ms. Layne had returned. Officer Knight had just finished speaking with 
Ms. Karren a few minutes earlier and knew that she was in the vicinity. R. 168 [14]. He 
also knew that she had been staying in the apartment. R. 167 [30]. Conversely, he knew 
that Ms. Layne was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15]. In light of all of this evidence, and 
reasonable inferences from the record, the trial court's finding that Officer Knight 
conducted a security sweep in part to check on the alleged victim is clearly erroneous. 
Second, regardless of the accuracy of the factual finding, the trial court's 
conclusion that Officer Knight's concern for the victim justified entry into Mr. Grossi's 
apartment is legally incorrect. R. 104. This is because there is nothing to show that an 
"emergency existed that required immediate entry to render assistance" to Ms. Layne. 
Bute. 43 F.3d at 539. Even if Officer Knight truly thought that Ms. Layne had returned, 
he did not testify that he thought she was injured or otherwise in need of help. In fact, this 
would have been unlikely considering that she had just jumped a fence and run off down 
the street. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer Knight did not see or hear anything from the 
bedroom to indicate that she was in need of help. R. 168 [17-18]. 
The Oregon case of State v. Davis is directly on point. In that case, police were 
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called to a motel where a fight was allegedly in progress. Davis. 666 P.2d at 804. When 
they arrived were was no fight, but a man approached and said that his girlfriend "might 
be being raped in room number nine by a man he had seen with an automatic pistol in his 
waistband." Id The police drew their guns, knocked on the door, and announced their 
presence. Id Shortly afterwards, a woman opened the door and walked out. Id. She was 
fully clothed and did not appear disheveled or frightened. Id She walked passed the 
officers without being questioned. Id Then, through a crack in the door the officers saw 
the defendant. Id They ordered him out of the room and he complied. Id 
Then the officers entered the motel room. Id The defendant said that he didn't 
want them in his room, but they searched it anyway. Id. Nobody searched the defendant 
or asked about the woman. Id. In the end, the officers found a gun and drugs, and the 
defendant was arrested. Id 
The Oregon Supreme Court held that, under the exigent circumstances doctrine, 
the officers had every right to approach the motel door and investigate. Id. at 810. 
However, when the woman calmly exited the room and walked away without any sign of 
victimization, the emergency dissipated. Id. After that, the officer's entry into the motel 
room could not be justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine. 
The circumstances of this case are remarkably similar. The police were called to 
the scene and had the right to knock on the Mr. Grossi's door, and perhaps even enter if 
Ms. Layne was being beaten or injured inside. However, that is not what occurred. 
Instead, Mr. Grossi emerged at Officer Knight's request and was arrested. R. 167 [5-7]. 
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And then, before Officer Knight entered the apartment, he was informed by Officer 
Beauchaine that Ms. Layne had emerged from the cellar door and had run away. R. 168 
[15]. At that point, any right that the police had to enter under the exigent circumstances 
doctrine receded. 
In short, Officer Knight's entry into Mr. Grossi's apartment cannot be justified 
under the exigent circumstances doctrine because there is no indication that Ms. Layne 
was in the apartment or that she needed immediate assistance. And so, the warrantless 
entry was unconstitutional and its fruits should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Grossi requests that this Court reverse Mr. Grossi's 
conviction and remand this case with instructions to suppress the evidence that resulted 
from the police officers' unconstitutional search and seizure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / * * day of October, 2002. 
stIEATHER J&kNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, HEATHER JOHNSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered 
eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 
2001 South State, S 3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this j / » * day of 
October, 2002. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of October, 2002. 
32 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ALBERT JAMES GROSSI, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 001919867 FS 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Date: February 1, 2 002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: WISSLER, SIRENA M. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BREEZE, ROBERT B. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 13, 1959 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:58 am 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/14/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison, 
The prison term is suspended• 
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Case No: 001919867 
Date: Feb 01, 2002 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $425.00 
Due: $925.00 
Total Fine: $500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $425.00 
Total Principal Due: $925.00 
Plus Interest 
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 925.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
SERVE 3 DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL WITH CREDIT FOR 3 DAYS 
SERVED. 
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Random drug testing for the first 3 months at least 1 time per 
week. Thereafter 1 time per month unless ordered differently. 
Obtain and maintain full time work. 
Not to associate with old friends that he used drugs with. 
Prior consent of Court/APPD for perscriptions. 
May be in a bar for the purpose of work and being paid. 
Complete 200 hours of community service hours in lieu of further 
jail. 
Continue and finish Drug Free Community after care program. 
Enter and complete the Domestic Violation program. 
Attend AA/CA/NA 2 times per week. 
To be given credit of $400.00 towards fine for payments made to 
Drug Free Community. 
Must complete the Domestic Violand and Drug Free programs. 
At this time no restitution is ordered owed. The State to provide 
within 30 days an amount if any owed. 
A warrant is not needed for searches by APPD/Officer. 
Mr Breeze does not need to be present at review. If therer is a 
problem the review will be continued to a setting that Mr Breeze 
can appear on. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/26/2002 
Time: 02:00 p.m, 
Location: 
Before Judge: 
Dated this 
Fourth Floor - N44 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
day of T-A- , 2o ,: . 
'LESElE A. LEWIS 
District Court Judder; t>*'^X' A 
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
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